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Non-technical summary Abstract
This paper tries to contribute to the discussion on the role of securities
settlement infrastructures for ￿nancial integration in Europe. It presents
a model that can explain a well-known stylized fact of securities settle-
ment, the surprisingly high fees charged by central securities depositories
(CSDs) for settlement through links between CSDs. As the model turns
out to provide a robust explanation for this stylized fact, it is then used
to analyzes an important policy question, the welfare e⁄ects of mergers of
CSDs.
Keywords: Securities settlement, link settlement fees, central securities
depositories.
JEL Classi￿cations: G21, G15, L13.
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Most developed countries have established a central securities depository
(CSD) as central institution for the depository and settlement of securities. In
many countries, the CSD is operated as a private company and may as such
have pro￿t maximization as main business goal.
Fees charged by CSDs for the settlement of securities transactions between
members of the same CSD are relatively low. However, when buyer and seller
are members of two di⁄erent CSDs (typically located in di⁄erent countries)
and the transaction is settled through a link between the two CSDs, then the
trading parties often pay substantial settlement fees. To reduce settlement fees,
banks may even try to avoid trading with foreign banks so that the high fees for
settlement across CSDs may to some extent hamper ￿nancial integration. Cross-
border consolidation of CSDs within Europe has been proposed as a possible
remedy.
CSDs argue that the high fees for settlement across CSDs simply re￿ ect the
underlying operational costs. Doubts may however be raised about this explana-
tion as modern information technology might allow for cross-border settlement
at reasonable costs.
The purpose of this theoretical paper is twofold.
Firstly, it provides an alternative explanation of the relatively high fees for
settlement through CSD links. This explanation refers to the strategic interac-
tion between two pro￿t maximizing CSDs when they set their settlement fees
independently. It does not refer to underlying costs for operating CSD links.
It is assumed that banks take settlement fees into account when they negotiate
over-the-counter with each other on securities prices. Consider for example a
bank that wishes to sell securities and assume that its CSD charges higher fees
for link settlement. The bank will demand a relatively low price for the securi-
ties when it negotiates with a bank that is member of the same CSD. And it will
demand a relatively high price when it negotiates with a bank that is member of
a di⁄erent CSD in order to recover its additional settlement costs. This implies
that the fee charged by a CSD for cross-border transactions is partly borne by
banks participating in the other CSD. CSDs therefore have incentives to charge
relatively high fees for settlement through CSD links and at the same time to
lower the fees for settlement within the CSD as a compensation for their own
members.
Secondly, the paper analyses the welfare e⁄ects of a merger of two CSDs that
are initially linked with each other. A full technological merger of the two CSDs
implies that the link can be abolished and all member banks are members of the
same single CSD. Although we assume that bank cannot freely choose one of
the CSDs but either have to use the CSD located in their own country or leave
the market altogether (i.e. although there is no direct competition between the
CSDs for members), we ￿nd that the two CSDs still interact due to the link
in a way that drives down settlement fees at given operational costs as long as
the CSDs are run independently. As a consequence, a merger of the two CSDs
reduces welfare as long as it does not reduce operational costs. Operational
5
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abolish the link. A merger therefore has a second, a cost reduction e⁄ect that
is positive for welfare. We ￿nd that in the present model, the overall e⁄ect of
a merger of the two CSDs on welfare is ambiguous and depends on the model
parameters. It follows that strong policy conclusions should not be made on the
basis of this paper.
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With the globalization of ￿nancial markets, more and more securities transac-
tions involve trading parties located in di⁄erent countries. Settlement, that is
the transfer of the securities from the seller to the buyer and the transfer of the
funds from the buyer to the seller, can in such a case require complicated and
costly steps, in particular if the buyer and the seller do not use the same settle-
ment service provider. The high costs of settlement across countries have been
identi￿ed as a major obstacle in the process of ￿nancial integration in particular
within Europe and has triggered a lively debate.1
This paper provides an explanation why an arguably relatively simple way
to settle cross-border securities transactions, namely through links between dif-
ferent national central securities depositories (CSDs), appears to be particularly
costly for investors. In this context, the paper also tries to shed some light on
the pros and cons of an intensively discussed remedy for this phenomenon at
least in Europe, the cross-border mergers of CSDs.2
1.1 Securities settlement
As indicated above, the transfer of securities from the seller to the buyer and the
transfer of the related funds from the buyer to the seller is referred to as securities
settlement. Today, securities and funds are typically transferred electronically
through account entries rather than physically. Funds are transferred through
payment systems, often operated by national central banks. To facilitate the
transfer of securities, many countries have established a CSD. A CSD can be
thought of as a central store house where securities are stored in paper form
or increasingly often electronically as computer entry. If an issuer wants to
issue securities in a given country, he usually deposits the entire issue with
the national CSD of that country. Investors who own securities need to have a
(direct or indirect) securities account relation with the CSD where the securities
issue is stored.
The transfer of securities can be explained by means of Figure 1. We assume
that there are two countries A and B with a national CSD in each country. There
are four investor institutions (banks or brokers) A, B, C and D. Arrows indicate
securities accounts so that A and B have securities accounts with CSD A while C
and D have securities accounts with CSD B. The CSDs have securities accounts
with each other, so-called link accounts.
In the simplest case, the buyer and the seller have their securities accounts
directly with the CSD at which the issue is deposited. Suppose for example that
A sells to B securities deposited in CSD A. The securities transfer then only
involves debiting the securities from the seller￿ s securities account and crediting
them to the buyer￿ s account.3 Settlement is simple also when A sells to B
1See for example Giovannini Group (2001, 2003).
2See for example Bourse Consult (2005).
3If buyer and seller also have cash acounts with the same institution, typically the national
central bank, then the transfer of funds involves debiting the buyer￿ s cash account with the
7
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securities deposited in CSD B. Again, the country B securities only need to be
debited from A￿ s account with CSD A and credited to B￿ s account with CSD
A.
If however A sells to C or vice versa, then a link account comes into play.
Suppose that A sells to (buys from) C securities deposited in CSD A. The
securities now need to be debited from A￿ s account with CSD A (C￿ s account
with CSD B), then credited to (debited from) CSD B￿ s account with CSD A
and ￿nally credited to C￿ s account with CSD B (A￿ s account with CSD A).
Similarly, suppose that A buys from C securities deposited in CSD B. The
securities now need to be debited from C￿ s account with CSD B, then credited
to CSD A￿ s account with CSD B and ￿nally credited to A￿ s account with CSD
A.
As an alternative to settlement through links between CSDs, investor in-
stitutions often use local custodians as intermediaries to settle across borders.
Assume that C has a securities account with B so that C could use B as lo-
cal custodian for country A securities. If A now sells to C securities deposited
in CSD A, then the securities could be transferred by debiting them from A￿ s
account with CSD A, crediting them to B￿ s account with CSD A and ￿nally
crediting them to C￿ s account with B.
One may ￿nd that settlement through links between CSDs might be more
e¢ cient than settlement through a local custodian. As C needs to have an
account relation with CSD B in any case to settle country B securities, it seems
to be reasonable that C also uses this account to settle transactions in country
A securities instead of opening an account with B for them. However, there are
strong indications that links are hardly used to settle across borders.4 And one
reason for this observation might be the surprisingly high prices CSDs charge
for settlement through links.
central bank and crediting the seller￿ s cash account with the central bank.
4See for example Giovannini Group (2001), page 10.
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It is worth having a closer look at the structure of the various settlement prices
charged by (European) CSDs to their participants.5 We distinguish four prices:
￿ The price for internal transfers of domestic securities. In Figure 1, this
would be for example the price that A and B (alike) have to pay to CSD
A for a transfer of country A securities from A to B.
￿ The price for internal transfer of foreign securities. In Figure 1, this would
be the price that A and B have to pay to CSD A for a transfer of country
B securities from A to B.
￿ The price for a transfer of domestic securities through a link. In Figure
1, this would be the price that A has to pay to CSD A for a transfer of
country A securities from A to C or vice versa.
￿ The price for a transfer of foreign securities through a link. In Figure
1, this would be the price that A has to pay to CSD A for a transfer of
country B securities from A to C or vice versa.
National CSDs typically charge the same price for both types of internal
transfers. They also charge the same price for both types of link transfers.
The prices for link transfers are however much higher than those for internal
transfers.6
There is an intensive debate in Europe about why prices for link settlement
are so much higher than those for internal settlement. It may not be a surprise
that the CSDs argue that their price schedules simply re￿ ect the underlying
(operating) costs of settlement. However, not everyone believes that in times
of modern information technology, the underlying costs for link settlements are
many times higher than those for internal settlement.
When elaborating on possible strategic (as opposed to cost-based) reasons
for this price structure, one may also take into consideration another price,
charged by one CSD to the other:
￿ The price charge by the CSD at which the securities are deposited (the
so-called issuer CSD) to the linked CSD (the so-called investor CSD) for
a link transfer. In Figure 1, this would be the price that CSD B has to
pay to CSD A for a transfer of country A securities from A to C or vice
versa.
5The fee schedules of the national CSDs of Germany, France and the Netherlands have
been studied in this respect.
6The price structure is in some cases highly complex as the average price often depends on
the number of transfers per month. Nevertheless, for the European Union, Nera (2004) for
example estimates that for an equity transaction settled internally within a CSD, the price
is in the range of EUR 0.35 to EUR 0.80 ($0.42 to $0.96), while a cross-border settlement
through a CSD link can cost up to EUR 35 ($42).
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prices to the investor CSD in order to prevent settlement business from moving
out of the issuer CSD. This could force the investor CSD to charge high prices
for transfers of foreign securities through a link. There is not much known about
the prices charged by issuer CSDs to investor CSDs for link transfers as they
are typically a matter of negotiations. However within the European Union, an
investor CSD could certainly complain with the European Commission as the
relevant competition authority, if an issuer CSD charges excessively high prices
to it.7 Moreover, many CSDs maintain bilateral links, i.e. both CSDs have a
link with the other as in Figure 1. As the prices charged by one CSD to the
other are typically a matter of bilateral negotiations, it appears to be likely that
these prices are not excessive in these cases.
1.3 Towards an explanation for the structure of settlement
prices
In this paper, we suggest a model with an alternative explanation for the high
link settlement prices. The structure of the model is basically the one depicted
in Figure 1. There are two national CSDs A and B. There are two (large)
groups of investor institutions, we call them for simplicity banks. Country A
banks can leave the market or participate in CSD A. Similarly, country B banks
can leave the market or participate in CSD B. Thus, banks cannot participate
in the foreign CSD.
The two national CSDs A and B are assumed to maximize pro￿ts and set
prices for internal and link settlement accordingly.8 Banks that decide not
to leave the market are randomly matched with one another to trade. The
probability for, say, a country A bank of being matched with a country B bank
is endogenous in our model. The more country B banks decided not to leave the
market and the more country A banks decided to leave the market, the higher
is the probability of being matched with a country B bank.
When two banks are matched, they start to negotiate on securities prices
whereby they take into account also the settlement prices. Suppose for example
that CSD A charges a higher price for link settlement than for internal settle-
ment. Suppose now that some country A bank wishes to sell, say, country A
securities. This bank now would try to get a higher price for the securities when
negotiating with a country B bank than in negotiations with another country
A bank in order to get compensation for the relatively high settlement prices
in case of trading with a bank located in country B. That means that the link
7Note for example that in June 2004, the European Commission found that Clearstream
Banking AG, the national German CSD, "infringed competition rules by refusing to supply
cross-border securities clearing and settlement services and by applying discriminatory prices"
to the international CSD Euroclear Bank.
8In reality, CSDs are typically private entities. Only a few (usually small) CSDs are still
operated by central banks or other public entities. CSDs that are private entities are often
subsidiaries of listed companies and the for-pro￿t assumption might appear reasonable. Other
CSDs argue to be user-owned and user-oriented rather than for-pro￿t.
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banks that do not participate in CSD A, but in CSD B.9
Suppose for simplicity that for participants of CSD A, the probability of
being matched with another participant of CSD A is 1
2, and of being matched
with a participant of CSD B is 1
2.10 This implies that when CSD A increases
the prices for link settlement and decreases those for internal settlement by the
same amount, then participants of CSD A get better o⁄ although they still
pay the same expected settlement prices as before. This is because they can
externalize parts of the price for link settlement to their trading partners in
CSD B in the negotiations for securities prices. Thus, with this strategy, CSD
A can attract more participants and raise pro￿ts. The same holds for CSD
B. In equilibrium, both CSDs will charge the highest possible link settlement
prices and use the revenues from link settlement to cross-subsidize the price for
internal settlement.
We discuss a basic and an extended model. In the basic model, we assume
that banks cannot in￿ uence the probability of being matched with participants
of the other CSD. When we later on extend the model, we assume that banks
can make an e⁄ort to make it more likely to be matched with a participant
of the same CSD. In the extended model, which is relatively complex so that
we can only solve it numerically, we still ￿nd that the link settlement prices
in equilibrium are relatively high, although somewhat lower than in the basic
model.
1.4 Welfare considerations
As our model can well explain the stylized facts of settlement prices, we feel
con￿dent enough to use our model to analyze an important policy question, the
welfare e⁄ects of (cross-border) mergers of national CSDs. In particular inter-
nationally active market participants have called for consolidation of European
CSDs through mergers as a way to trim down the costs of cross-border settle-
ment. Indeed, several mergers have taken place already in Europe recently.11
However, some players also argue that mergers of CSDs could reduce competi-
tion in the settlement industry and could therefore also have adverse e⁄ects on
market e¢ ciency.12
9It is apparent that we assume that securities are traded over-the-counter rather than on an
exchange as securities prices are determined in direct negotiations between the buyer and the
seller. This assumption is reasonable as trades executed on an exchange are typically settled
within a single CSD without using links. Transfers from the seller to the buyer through a
link between CSDs typically result from over-the-counter trades. For a discussion of the use
of links for on-exchange trades, see Tapking and Yang (2006).
10As mentioned above, these probabilities will be endogenous in our model.
11The national CSDs of Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the UK have been merged
(together with the international CSD Euroclear Bank) to form Euroclear Group. Clearstream
International comprises the German national CSD and the international CSD Clearstream
Banking Luxembourg. The national CSDs of Sweden and Finland have been merged to form
Nordic CSD.
12See Giovannini Group (2003), in particular Section 3.
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country A banks can only participate in CSD A, but not in CSD B. And country
B banks can only participate in CSD B. Nevertheless, there is strong strategic
interaction between the two CSDs. If, say, CSD A decreases its settlement
prices, then more country A banks will participate in it. This implies in our
model that the probability for country B banks to be matched with a country
A bank increases. As the prices for link settlement are high, this could make
country B banks leave the market so that CSD B would need to lower its own
prices. Thus, there is indirect price pressure as long as the two CSDs set prices
independently: if one CSD lowers its prices, then the other CSD will follow.
In our basic model, we ￿nd that a merger of the two CSDs reduces welfare
as long as the merger does not reduce any operating costs. The reason is of
course the indirect price pressure just mentioned as this price pressure will be
removed after a merger. However, if the two CSDs are not only legally merged,
but also technically so that they use one account system and do not need to
operate links anymore, then the merger is bene￿cial from a welfare perspective
due to lower operating costs.
However, this only holds in our basic model. In the extended model, even
a full technical merger of the two CSDs can reduce welfare, if the operating
costs for settlement through links are higher than those for internal settlement.
In this case, banks should, from a welfare perspective, make an e⁄ort to avoid
settlement through links and are indeed encouraged to do so by the very high
equilibrium prices for link settlement. The positive welfare e⁄ect of a technical
merger of the CSDs, i.e. of the removal of the link and the related costs, now
does not o⁄set anymore the positive e⁄ect of the indirect price pressure in case
that the CSDs do not merge.
Thus, our welfare results derived from the basic model are not robust so that
a strong policy conclusion cannot be drawn from our model.
1.5 Academic literature
Motivated by the ongoing policy discussion on the European ￿nancial market
infrastructure, there is an increasing body of academic literature on the secu-
rities settlement industry, mainly focused on questions related to competition
between and consolidation of di⁄erent service providers.
Kauko (2003) might be the paper that is closest related to ours. The paper
tries to explain why links between CSDs are set up, but are often hardly used.
It argues that a CSD could allow other CSDs to open links with it in order
to commit itself to relatively low prices. Without links, the CSD can lock in
its participants and then charge excessively high fees. In anticipation of such a
strategy, potential participants could be deterred from using the CSD. If other
CSDs maintain links to it, then its participants could leave the CSD and settle
elsewhere if the CSD starts charging excessive prices. The CSD will therefore
charge only modest prices so that potential participants are not deterred. The
links will nevertheless not be used. The paper however does not provide an
explanation of the relatively high prices for link settlement.
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national CSDs (horizontal mergers) that are linked with each other and compare
them with those of mergers of a CSD with a stock exchange (vertical mergers).
They ￿nd that in their model, both types of mergers are welfare improving, but
horizontal mergers are even better than vertical mergers. As in the present pa-
per, the positive e⁄ect of horizontal mergers is partly a consequence of the lower
operating cost when a link between CSDs can be closed after a full technical
merger of two CSDs.
With a view to the potentially negative competition e⁄ects of mergers of
CSDs, Serifsoy and Weiss (2005) argue that the best model for Europe would be
a single, but contestable CSD. Schmiedel and Sch￿nenberger (2005) summarize
the main trends and points of discussion in the industry in Europe. The empir-
ical papers by Schmiedel, Malkamaki and Tarkka (2002) and by Van Cayseele
(2005) ￿nd signi￿cant economies of scale in securities settlement, suggesting that
mergers of CSDs should generally reduce operating costs of settlement. Other
less related papers on consolidation in the settlement industry are the theoreti-
cal papers by Koeppl and Monnet (2004), Holthausen and Tapking (2006) and
Rochet (2005).
1.6 Structure of the paper
The assumptions of our basic model are introduced in Section 2. The Sections
3 and 4 present the equilibrium before and after a merger of the CSDs in our
basic model. The welfare results of the basic model are discussed in Section 5.
Finally, the extended model is introduced and analyzed in Section 6.
2 The model
There are two countries A and B. There are two pro￿t maximizing CSDs: CSD
A is located in country A and CSD B is located in country B. In each country,
there is a continuum [0; 1
2] of banks. The banks are the potential participants
(i.e. securities account holders) in the CSDs. However, we assume that banks
located in country A can participate only in CSD A and banks located in country
B can only participate in CSD B.
There are two types of securities. Securities of type A have been issued in
CSD A and securities of type B have been issued in CSD B. The two CSDs are
linked with each other so that securities issued in one CSD can also be held and
settled in the other CSD. The bilateral link consists of (i) a securities account
of CSD B with CSD A to transfer A securities from CSD A to CSD B and back
and (ii) a securities account of CSD A with CSD B to transfer B securities from
CSD B to CSD A and back.
Two types of settlement can occur: (1) Securities may need to be transferred
from one participant in CSD k (k = A;B) to another participant in the same
CSD k (internal settlement in CSD k); In this case, CSD k debits the account of
the delivering participant and credits the account of the receiving participant.
13
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participant in CSD l (l = A;B, l 6= k); (a) If country k securities are being
transferred, then CSD k debits them from the account of the delivering partic-
ipant and credits them to CSD l￿ s account with CSD k, while CSD l credits
them to the receiving participant. (b) If l securities are being transferred, then
CSD k debits them from the account of the delivering participant while CSD l
debits them from CSD k￿ s account with CSD l and credits them to the account
of the receiving participant in CSD l.
Decisions are taken by the di⁄erent players in several steps. First, the two
CSDs negotiate on the prices rA and rB. Here, rk is the price that CSD l (the
investor CSD) has to pay to CSD k (the issuer CSD) whenever CSD k debits or
credits CSD l￿ s account. As our model is completely symmetric with respect to
the two CSDs, we assume that the CSDs always agree on rA = rB = r for some
(non-negative) number r. This assumption will later on ensure that rA and rB
drop out when the CSDs maximize pro￿ts so that we do not need to determine
rA and rB in equilibrium.
Second, CSD A sets the prices pAA, pBA, qAA and qBA while CSD B si-
multaneously set the prices pAB, pBB, qAB and qBB. Here, pAk (pBk) is the
price that a participant in CSD k has to pay whenever his account with CSD k
is debited or credited to transfer A (B) securities from his account to another
participant in CSD k or from another participant in CSD k to his account (in-
ternal settlement within CSD k). And qAk (pBk) is the price that he has to
pay whenever his account with CSD k is debited or credited to transfer A (B)
securities from his account to a participant in CSD l or from a participant in
CSD l to his account (external settlement across the two CSDs).
When a CSD debits or credits accounts, it incurs operating costs. Costs
functions of the CSDs are linear. The costs that CSD k incurs when it debits
or when it credits an account to transfer k securities (i.e. domestic securities)
from one participant with CSD k to another participant with CSD k (internal
settlement) are cDI. The costs that CSD k incurs when it debits or when
it credits an account to transfer l securities (i.e. foreign securities) from one
participant with CSD k to another participant with CSD k (internal settlement)
are cFI. The costs that it incurs when it debits or when it credits an account
to transfer k securities across the CSDs (external settlement) are cDE. And its
costs when it debits or when it credits an account to transfer l securities across
the CSDs are cFE. The overall costs of settling a transaction across CSDs are
thus cFE + 2cDE. The overall costs of settling a transaction internally in one
CSD are 2cDI in case of a domestic securities and 2cFI in case of a foreign
securities. We assume that cFE + 2cDE ￿ 2cDI = 2cFI as this assumption
appears empirically reasonable.
Third, each bank located in country k has to decide if it would like to
participate in CSD k (i.e. to open a securities account with CSD k) or to opt
out. For any country k bank i 2 [0; 1
2], participating in CSD k costs t ￿ i. Here,
t is an exogenous parameter. Denote a the number of banks that go to CSD A
and b the number of banks that go to CSD B. The number of country A (B)
banks that opt out is then 1
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securities each and does not bene￿t from holding A securities (potential sellers
of A securities). The other half of these banks does not receive A securities, but
would have bene￿ts v from holding A securities (potential buyers of A securities).
Similarly, one half of all those banks that have not opted out receives one unit
of B securities each and does not bene￿t from holding them (potential sellers),
while the other half of banks does not receive B securities, but would have
bene￿ts v from holding B securities (potential buyers). Potential buyers and
sellers of both types of securities are selected randomly.
Finally, each potential seller of A securities is matched with a potential buyer
of A securities to trade. And each potential seller of B securities is matched
with a potential buyer of B securities. Thus, each bank that has not opted out
is matched twice, once to trade A securities and once to trade B securities. If








2v and both reach a utility of 1
2v ￿ pkA. If 1
2v ￿ pkA < 0, then
they do not trade. Similarly, if two country B banks are matched to trade k
securities, then they agree on a price sk
bb such that
sk




2v and both reach a utility of 1
2v￿pkB. If 1
2v￿pkB < 0, then they
do not trade. Thus, when they set prices, the CSDs will have to ensure that
pkA;pkB ￿ 1
2v. Note that this implies that we have to assume cDI;cFI ￿ 1
2v.
Otherwise, trade would not be possible.
If a country A and a country B bank are matched to trade k securities and
the country A bank is the seller, then they agree on a price sk
ab such that
sk




2(v+￿qkA￿￿qkB). The parameter ￿ will turn out to be crucial in
our model. It is therefore important to understand its economic interpretation.
If ￿ = 1, then each bank takes fully into account its settlement costs when it
negotiates with the other bank. If ￿ = 0, then the banks ignore settlement costs
when they negotiate. From the trade, the country A bank reaches a utility of
1
2[v ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qkA ￿ ￿qkB] and the country B bank of 1
2[v ￿ ￿qkA ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qkB].
If v ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qkA ￿ ￿qkB < 0 or v ￿ ￿qkA ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qkB < 0, then they do not
trade.
Finally, if a country A and a country B bank are matched to trade k securities
and the country A bank is the buyer, then they agree on a price sk
ba such that
sk




2(v ￿ ￿qkA + ￿qkB). The country A bank reaches a utility of
1
2[v ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qkA ￿ ￿qkB] and the country B bank of 1
2[v ￿ ￿qkA ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qkB].
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trade.
The probability that a given country A bank is matched with a country B




Here, ￿ is an exogenous parameter. If ￿ = 1, then the probability only depends
on the proportion of a and b banks and a = b implies that a country A bank is
equally likely matched with a country A bank and with a country B bank. If
￿ < 1, then the probability for a country A bank of being matched with another
country A bank is relatively high. For conceptional reasons, we at least need
to assume that ￿ ￿ 1 because otherwise, the probability ￿ b
a+b could exceed 1
for su¢ ciently small values of a. Indeed, we assume throughout the paper that
￿ < 1 as this assumption appears empirically reasonable.
















Similarly, a country B bank￿ s probability of being matched with a country



















De￿ne pA = pAA+pBA, qA = qAA+qBA, pB = pAB+pBB, qB = qAB+qBB.
Country A bank i￿ s utility if it decides to participate in CSD A is














Country B bank i￿ s utility if it decides to participate in CSD B is
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as long as for given prices, this system of equations has a solution a;b 2 [0; 1
2].
Although it typically has two solutions, numerical evaluations on the computer
show that at most one of them ful￿ls a;b 2 [0; 1
2]. If for a given combination
of prices, the system 1 does not have a solution with a;b 2 [0; 1
2], then corner
solutions occur.
Figure 2 describes cases with and without such corner solutions. We assume
￿ = ￿ = t = v = qA = qB = 1
2, pB = 1
5. As long as we have an interior solution,
we ￿nd that a decreases and b increases when pA is increasing. Why does b
increase when pA is increasing? As a is decreasing in pA, the probability of a
country B bank to be matched with a country A bank, i.e. the probability that
the country B bank has to pay qA, goes down when pA increases. As we assume
in the example that qB is very high (qB = v), more country B banks are ready
to participate in CSD B when pA is increasing.
Note that corner solutions with a = 0 or with b = 0 cannot occur as uA;0 =
uA ￿ 0 as long as prices pA, qA, pB and qB must not exceed v. Corner solutions
with a = 1
2 or with b = 1
2 occur if domestic prices are low and/or foreign prices
are high, provided that t is su¢ ciently small. To avoid corner solutions with
a = 1
2 or with b = 1
2, we assume from now on that t ￿ 2v as this implies
that country A (B) bank i = 1
2 will not participate in CSD A (B) even if
pA = qA = pB = qB = 0.
Let c = cFE + 2cDE ￿ cDI ￿ cFI and cI = cDI + cFI. Note that c ￿ 0
as we assume cFE + 2cDE ￿ 2cDI = 2cFI. Moreover, cI ￿ v as we assume
cDI = cFI ￿ 1

























(qB ￿ pB ￿ c) + b(pB ￿ cI)
where we made use of our assumption that rA = rB.
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January 2007Figure 2: Demand parameters a and b as they vary with pA for ￿ = ￿ = t = v =
qA = qB = 1
2, pB = 1
5. For pA 2 [0:17;0:31], we have a = 1
tuA and b = 1
tuB.
For pA < 0:17, we get a = 1
2 and b = 1
tuB(= 0:44). For pA > 0:31, we get
a = 1
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In this section, we assume that the two CSDs set their prices independently. We
only consider symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which we have pAk = pBk
and qAk = qBk for k = A;B, pA = pB and qA = qB. In the appendix, we prove
the following:
Proposition 1 Let ￿ > 0. Let v ￿ cI +
￿(3￿2￿)
4￿3￿ c.13 If there is a symmetric
equilibrium, then it is given by










qA = qB = v
a = b =
1
2t




We are not able to provide a full proof that the prices of proposition 1 indeed
constitute an equilibrium. However, we evaluate numerically on the computer
a wide range of parameter constellations and ￿nd that for all these parameter
constellations, the above prices are also su¢ cient for an equilibrium. We are
therefore su¢ ciently con￿dent that proposition 1 describes a unique symmetric
equilibrium.1415
Our analysis gives a simple explanation of why the prices of external settle-
ment through a link between CSDs are so high. As long as ￿ > 0, participants
of, for instance, CSD A can partially shift the burden of high external settlement
prices charged by CSD A to their trading partners who participate in CSD B.
Thus, a participant in CSD A su⁄ers less, if his expected settlement price to be
paid to CSD A increase due to a higher price qA instead of due to a higher price
pA. Or in other words, if CSD A increases qA and at the same time decreases
pA in a way that leaves the expected settlement price its participants have to
13This is needed to ensure that pro￿ts ￿A and ￿B do not get negative for the prices of
proposition 1.
14Note that there are parameter constellations such that the prices given in Proposition
1 are the only prices that satisfy our su¢ cient conditions for a symmetric equilibrium, but
do not constitute an equilibrium. We have excluded such parameter constellations by our
assumption that t ￿ 2v. An example would be ￿ = 9
10, t = v = ￿ = c = 1
2, cI = 0. The
prices according to Proposition 1 would be pA = pB = 1
13, qA = qB = 1
2 which would give
￿A = 0:0197. If now CSD A increases pA until pA = 1
13 + 1
71, then ￿A decreases until it
is at ￿A = 0:0193, and b = 1
2 now. If CSD A now further increases pA, then ￿A starts to
increase (b remains at b = 1
2, a decreases). At pA = 1
10, we get ￿A = 0:02. Thus, the prices
of Proposition 1 do not constitute an equilibrium.
15It should be noted that substantially di⁄erent results would occur if we did not assume
￿ < 1 and c ￿ 0. It is easy to show that we would get a symmetric equilibrium given by
pA = pB = cI
qA = qB =
4
3v ￿ 4
3cI + ￿cI + 1
3￿c
￿
if ￿c ￿ (v ￿ cI)(3￿ ￿ 4), implying that qA = qB < v. However, this condition is apparently
not compatible with our assumption ￿ < 1 and c ￿ 0.
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January 2007pay to it unchanged, then all its participants get better o⁄. Accordingly, CSD
A has clear incentives to set qA = v and to choose a relatively low price pA.
Note that the equilibrium prices do not depend on ￿ as long as ￿ > 0. The
above e⁄ect holds even if ￿ is very small.
For ￿ = 0, there is a range of symmetric equilibria. As this range of equilibria
is di¢ cult to describe, we do not give a full description here. But we note that
the price combination of proposition 1 is still an equilibrium when ￿ = 0. At
the same time, it can be shown that







a = b =
1
2t




is also an equilibrium. As ￿ = 0, the CSDs do not have incentives anymore to
choose a very high price for external settlement.16
4 Integration of CSDs
We now assume that the two CSDs are merged so that they are operated by the
same company. We distinguish two steps in the merger process. In a ￿rst step,
the two CSDs are brought under the same corporate roof, but are technically
operated on di⁄erent platforms. We refer to this as a (purely) legal merger of
the CSDs. In a second step, the two CSDs are also technically merged, i.e. they
are operated on the same technical platform. That means that all trades are
now settled internally, even trades between a country A bank and a country B
bank. In our model, a technical merger of the CSDs implies that c = 0 and that
pA = pB = qA = qB.
Ultimately, every merger of CSDs will result in a technical merger as the
operator of the merged CSDs will aim at minimizing operating costs. Never-
theless, analyzing a legal merger as an intermediate step towards an eventually
technical merger is important to fully understand the economics behind our
formal results. It allows us to separate a competition e⁄ect from a cost e⁄ect
of the merger. A purely legal merger has a competition e⁄ect as it changes
the strategic interaction between the CSDs from a competitive to a cooperative
interaction. A technical merger that follows the legal merger then has a cost
reduction e⁄ect. To strengthen the economic intuition, we assume that after
a legal merger, the operator of the CSDs has to choose already pA = pB and
16Indeed, there is for a range of pB-qB combination respectively a multiplicity of best
responses (pA;qA) of CSD A (that all satisfy a = b and that all lead to the same values a and
b). For example, pA = qA = 1
2[v + 1





(1 ￿ ￿)v + 1
4￿c + cI
2 ￿ ￿
, qA = v
Note that pB = qB = 1
2[v+ 1
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however does not change the parameter c. We get the following
Proposition 2 Let v ￿ cI + 1
2￿c. If the two CSDs are legally merged and the
operator of the CSDs has to choose pA = pB and qA = qB, then we get in
equilibrium




a = b =
1
2t




and 0 ￿ pB = pA ￿ v, 0 ￿ qB = qA ￿ v.
Note that a and b under a legal merger are lower than under complete
separation of CSDs (provided that c > 0). This is very easy to verify. Why is this
so? As discussed, the CSDs have under complete separation strong incentives
to set prices for external settlement equal to v. For given qA = qB = v, the two
CSDs play a Bertrand game to choose the prices pA and pB. If CSD B lowers
pB, than b goes up and the probability for a country A bank to be matched with
a country B bank increases, i.e. a decreases. To o⁄set this e⁄ect, CSD A would
decrease pA. Or to put it di⁄erently, the best response function p￿
A(pB) of CSD
A on a price pB has a positive slope. Thus, there exist (indirect) competitive
pressures that drive down the prices for internal settlement, if the two CSDs are
separated. If the two CSDs are merged, these pressures do not exist anymore.
Now we move on to a situation in which the two CSDs are technically merged
and get
Corollary 3 Let v ￿ cI. If the two CSDs are technically merged, then we get
in equilibrium




a = b =
1
2t
[v ￿ cI] ￿ aTI
Note that a and b are now greater than under complete separation. Thus,
we ￿nd that aTI > aCS > aLI. The competition e⁄ect of a merger increases
prices and lowers demands a and b. The cost reduction e⁄ect lowers prices and
increases demands. And the cost reduction e⁄ect is apparently stronger than
the competition e⁄ect.
5 Welfare
Overall economic welfare is de￿ned by
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W = 2￿A + ta2
= 2va ￿ ta2 ￿ 2a(
1
2
￿c + cI) ￿ W(a;c)
In the appendix, we prove
Proposition 4 Let v ￿ cI +
￿(3￿2￿)
4￿3￿ c. We get W(aTI;0) ￿ W(aCS;c) ￿
W(aLI;c).
Thus, the economic welfare is highest after a full technical merger of the two
CSDs, and lowest after a purely legal merger. This of course does not come
as a surprise given the results of the previous two sections. As the two CSDs
have market power, any measure that results in lower settlement prices and
higher demand should increase welfare. And we have seen that a purely legal
merger of the CSDs reduces indirect competitive pressure and leads therefore
to higher prices. A full technical merger however reduces prices more than the
legal merger increased them and increases demand more than the legal merger
reduced demand.
6 Extension: banks can in￿ uence matching prob-
abilities
We now discuss an extension of our model. Up until now, we have assumed
that the banks take the probability of being matched with a bank located in
the other country as given. We now assume that every bank can make an e⁄ort
to install facilities which make it more or less likely to be matched with a bank
located in the same country. Let eA (eB) be the e⁄ort that each country A (B)
bank (except bank i) undertakes. The country A bank i￿ s probability of being





￿ ￿ei ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)eA ￿ eB
where ei denotes country A bank i￿ s e⁄ort. Its expected bene￿t from trading k





￿ ￿ei ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)eA ￿ eB]
1
2











v ￿ pkA + [￿
b
a + b
￿ ￿ei ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)eA ￿ eB][pkA ￿
1
2
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January 2007Bank i￿ s e⁄ort costs are d￿(ei)2. Its expected utility from trading both securities,
taking into account its e⁄ort costs is thus
uA = uA
A + uB
A ￿ d ￿ (ei)2
= v ￿ pA + [￿
b
a + b
￿ ￿ei ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)eA ￿ eB][pA ￿
1
2
(2 ￿ ￿)qA ￿
1
2
￿qB] ￿ d ￿ (ei)2











As this optimal e⁄ort level ei does not depend on those of the other banks (ea





























(qA + qB ￿ pA ￿ pB)
as the probability for a country A bank of being matched with a country B







(qA + qB ￿ pA ￿ pB)





























Finally, country A bank i￿ s utility if it decides to participate in CSD A is
uA;i = uA ￿ ti
while country B bank i would get utility
uB;i = uB ￿ ti
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(qA + qB ￿ pA ￿ pB)](qB ￿ pB ￿ c) + b(pB ￿ cI)
where we assumed that rA = rB.
In the appendix, we describe a set of conditions that are necessary for a sym-
metric equilibrium. We solve these conditions numerically for various parameter
constellations. We also calculate for all these cases the respective equilibrium
welfare as de￿ned in Section 5. We use a heuristic approach to verify that
for the respective parameter constellations, the prices that ful￿l our necessary
conditions indeed constitute an equilibrium.
Our extended model is unfortunately too complicated to be solved analyti-
cally. We therefore apply numerical technics to evaluate our model. Our proce-
dure is described in the Appendix. We now discuss ￿rst parameter constellations
with c = 0 and then turn to those with c > 0.
In Figure ??, we present the equilibrium prices and welfare as a function of
￿, where we assume ￿ = 1
2, c = 0, cI = 1
4, t = 2, ￿ = v = d = 1. We see that pA
increases with ￿, while qA remains ￿rst at qA = 1 and then starts to decrease.
The reason is simple: As ￿ increases, it is getting cheaper for the banks to
avoid settlement through the links. To keep their pro￿ts at a high level, the
CSDs increase the price for internal settlement. Moreover, they narrow the gap
between the prices for internal settlement and for link settlement to reduce the
incentives for banks to avoid link settlement. We also observe that less banks
participate in the CSDs (a decreases) and that pro￿ts go down (￿A decreases) as
￿ increases. This is interesting as it is getting cheaper for the banks to avoid the
expensive settlement across the CSDs when ￿ goes up so that one would expect
more banks to participate. However, under the given parameters, the impact
of the on average higher settlement prices appears to be stronger. Finally, we
observe that welfare is decreasing as ￿ increases. This is plausible as we assume
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e⁄ort to avoid settlement across the CSDs.
The picture looks di⁄erent for c > 0 as we show in Figure 3, where we
assume ￿ = 1
2, c = 1
8, cI = 1
4, t = 2, ￿ = v = d = 1. Again, pA increases with
￿, while qA remains ￿rst at qA = 1 and then starts to decrease. If ￿ increases
beyond 7
10, then we get corner solutions with link settlement probabilities of 0
which we ignore for simplicity. We now see that a is increasing in ￿ for low
values of ￿ and then starts to decrease. The pro￿t ￿A is increasing in ￿. Most
importantly, welfare W is also increasing in ￿ for low values of ￿. It is immediate
to check that in case of technical integration of the two CSDs, welfare would be
at W = 0:1992. Thus, we see that for ￿ ￿ 1
10, we get higher welfare levels in
case of complete separation.
Why can welfare now increase when ￿ increases and c > 0? As c > 0, banks
should make an e⁄ort to avoid settlement through the links. And they do so the
greater ￿ is. That means that the cost reduction e⁄ect of a technical merger,
which only refers to the operating costs for the links, is getting less important
when ￿ increases as the links are used less and less anyway.
To summarize, we ￿nd that in our extended model, the prices for link set-
tlement are still higher than those for internal settlement, although the gap
between the prices is smaller than in the basic model. In this respect, the ex-
tended model does not provide major new insights. However, in our basic model,
a technical merger of the CSD was always welfare improving in comparison to
completely separated CSDs. This is not the case in our extended model so that
the analysis of the extended model shows that the welfare results obtained from
our basic model are not robust.
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2, c = 1
8, cI = 1
4, t = 2,
￿ = v = d = 1. This implies that the welfare in case of a technical integration
of the two CSDs is W = 0:1992.
7 Conclusions and discussion
We presented a model that explains why fees for settlement through CSD links
are much higher than those for settlement within a CSD. Our explanation is
very much based on the assumption that securities traders take settlement fees
into account when they negotiate with each other on securities prices.
One may argue that although the fees for settlement across CSDs are much
higher than those for settlement within a CSD, settlement fees are generally so
small compared to values of typical transactions that traders simply ignore them
when they negotiate on securities prices. However, in this context two points
should be noted: (1) Our result holds even if ￿ is very small, but positive. Thus,
traders need to take settlement fees only to a very small extent into account to
get the results of our model. (2) For the traders, not the value of transactions
matters, but the (expected) bene￿t of transactions - and the bene￿t might be
much smaller than the value.
As our model appears to be powerful as an explanation for an important
stylized fact of securities settlement, we use it to analyze welfare e⁄ects of merg-
ers of CSDs. We ￿nd however, that the welfare e⁄ects depend on the model
speci￿cation so that we do not obtain any robust results. Thus, a clear policy
recommendation cannot be drawn from our model.
8 Appendix



































The market shares a and b are given by



















(2 ￿ ￿)qB] (5)
Total di⁄erentiation gives
t ￿ da = ￿dpA ￿ ￿
b
(a + b)2[pA ￿
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t ￿ db = ￿￿
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1
2






(a + b)2[pA ￿
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(a + b)2[pB ￿
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For pA = pB and qA = qB, we get
a = b =
1
t
























4(2 ￿ ￿)xa + ￿1
4￿(xa ￿ t)









4(2 ￿ ￿)(xa ￿ t) + ￿1
4￿xa

























[v ￿ pA +
1
2
￿(pA ￿ qA) ￿
1
4




(2 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ pA) + 1
2(3 ￿ ￿)￿(pA ￿ qA)
















) + (pA ￿ cI)
da
dpA






[v ￿ pA +
1
2
￿(pA ￿ qA) ￿
1
4
￿(qA ￿ pA ￿ c)]






4(v ￿ pA) + 3￿(pA ￿ qA)
v ￿ pA + ￿(pA ￿ qA)
￿ V
Recall that CSD A and CSD B have to ensure that v￿(2￿￿)qkA￿￿qkB ￿ 0
and v ￿ ￿qkA ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qkB ￿ 0 so that






￿ g, if ￿ > 0
1
2v, if ￿ = 0
Assume that CSD B plays pAB = pBB and qAB = qBB. It is easy to see that
we now get f(qkB) = 1
2g(qB) for k = A;B with
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￿ g, if ￿ > 0
v, if ￿ = 0
CSD A￿ s best response requires that it maximizes ￿A with respect to pA and
qA subject to 0 ￿ pA ￿ v and 0 ￿ qA ￿ g(qB). De￿ne the Lagrange function
LA = ￿A + ￿ppA + ￿qqA + ￿p[v ￿ pA] + ￿q[g(qB) ￿ qA] (14)
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for LA are then necessary conditions for (pA;qA)
being a best response of CSD A on (pB;qB) (given that pAB = pBB and qAB =
qBB). Finally, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for LA together with pA = pB,
qA = qB form necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium. Thus, the
necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium are
V + ￿p ￿ ￿p = 0
U + ￿q ￿ ￿q = 0
￿p;￿q;￿p;￿q ￿ 0
0 ￿ pA ￿ v;0 ￿ qA ￿ g(qA)
￿p ￿ pA = ￿q ￿ qA = ￿p[v ￿ pA] = ￿q[g(qA) ￿ qA] = 0
We ￿rst look at the constraint qA ￿ g(qA). Assume that g(qA) =
2v￿￿qA
(2￿￿) .
We apparently get in this case qA ￿ g(qA) , qA ￿ v. Now assume that
g(qA) =
2v￿(2￿￿)qB
￿ . Again we get qA ￿ g(qA) , qA ￿ v. Thus we in general
have qA < g(qA) , qA < v and qA = g(qA) , qA = v.
We now have to discuss the following nine cases, where we will occasionally












v ￿ pA + 1
2￿(pA ￿ qA)
v ￿ pA + ￿(pA ￿ qA)
(15)
(A) ￿p = ￿q = ￿p = ￿q = 0, i.e. U = V = 0. It is easy to see that
U = V = 0 requires pA = cI and thus
v ￿ pA +
1
2
￿(pA ￿ qA) ￿
1
4
￿(qA ￿ pA ￿ c) = 0




3cI + ￿cI + 1
3￿c
￿
To ensure qA ￿ g(qA), we need
4
3v ￿ 4





￿c ￿ (v ￿ cI)(3￿ ￿ 4)
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so that we get a contradiction.
(B) ￿p = ￿q = ￿p = [g(qA) ￿ qA] = 0, i.e. V = 0, U = ￿q and qA = v. From




























As we need to ensure ￿q ￿ 0, we ￿nd ￿c ￿ (v ￿ cI)(3￿ ￿ 4). This condition
is always ful￿lled as cI ￿ v, ￿ ￿ 1 and c ￿ 0. Next, we need pA ￿ v, i.e.
v ￿ cI ￿
￿(1￿￿)
4￿3￿ c. As 1 ￿ ￿ < 3 ￿ 2￿, this is ful￿lled if the condition given in
the proposition is ful￿lled. Finally, we need a ￿ 1
2. It is easy to show that this
requires
￿(1￿￿)
4￿3￿ c ￿ v￿cI ￿t. This is always the case as we assume that t ￿ 2v.












ful￿ls the necessary conditions, if the condition given in the proposition is ful-
￿lled.
(C) ￿p = ￿q = v ￿ pA = ￿q = 0, i.e. U = 0, V = ￿p and pA = v. With




(2 ￿ ￿)(v ￿ cI) < 0
so that we get a contradiction as we need ￿p ￿ 0.
(D) ￿p = qA = ￿p = ￿q = 0, i.e. V = 0, U = ￿￿q and qA = 0. With





v ￿ pA + 1
2￿pA
v ￿ pA + ￿pA
To ensure that ￿q ￿ 0, we apparently need pA ￿ cI. However, this would lead
to ￿A < 0 as qA = 0. It is clear that this cannot be an equilibrium.
(E) pA = ￿q = ￿p = ￿q = 0, i.e. U = 0, V = ￿￿p and pA = 0. With











Apparently, we get ￿p < 0 as ￿ ￿ 1 and qA ￿ v.
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So that ￿p < 0 which is a contradiction.
(G) pA = qA = ￿p = ￿q = 0. This apparently cannot be an equilibrium.
(H) ￿p = ￿q = v ￿ pA = q(qA) ￿ qA = 0, i.e. qA = pA = v. This apparently
cannot be an equilibrium.











￿c ￿ (v ￿ cI)
1
4
(3 ￿ ￿)] ￿ 0
















This together is impossible as (3 ￿ ￿) < 3.
Thus, we now know that only the prices given in Proposition 1 ful￿l the
necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium.
￿
Numerical analysis to verify that Proposition 1 is indeed an equilibrium:
We now know that only the prices given in Proposition 1 ful￿l the necessary
conditions for a symmetric equilibrium. However, to show that Proposition
1 indeed describes an equilibrium, we have to show that CSD A￿ s strategy
is indeed a best response on CSD B￿ s strategy. Unfortunately, it is extremely
cumbersome to provide a general proof. We therefore employ numerical methods
and computer evaluations. Any best response on some strategy (pB;qB) has to












+ ￿p ￿ ￿p = 0
0 ￿ pA ￿ v;0 ￿ qA ￿ g(qB), ￿p;￿q;￿p;￿q ￿ 0
￿p ￿ pA = ￿q ￿ qA = ￿p[v ￿ pA] = ￿q[g(qB) ￿ qA] = 0
on the lagrange function 14 as necessary conditions, where the equations 2,
3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 for the variables d￿A
dqA , d￿A





dpA, xa, xb, ya and yb have to hold. We test 100 randomly selected
parameter constellations with ￿;￿;v;t;c;cI 2 f0; 1
10; 2
10;:::; 9
10;1g that ful￿l our
assumptions ￿;t;v > 0, ￿ < 1, v ￿ cI, c ￿ 0, t ￿ 2v and v ￿ cI ￿
￿(3￿2￿)
4￿3￿ c
and respectively assume that pB and qB are given as in Proposition 1. We
respectively determine all combinations (pA;qA) that ful￿l the above Kuhn-
Tucker conditions. We ￿nd that for all of these parameter constellations, the
prices pA and qA as given in Proposition 1 (and only these prices) constitute a
best response of CSD A on pB and qB as given in Proposition 1.
￿
Proof of Proposition 2:
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￿A + ￿B = 2[￿
a
2















(￿qA + (2 ￿ ￿)pA)]
so that










[￿qA + (2 ￿ ￿)pA ￿ ￿c ￿ 2cI][v ￿
1
2
(￿qA + (2 ￿ ￿)pA)]
Maximizing with respect to ￿qA + (2 ￿ ￿)pA immediately gives as maximizer













Proof of Proposition 4:
Note that W(a;c) is a concave function in a with a maximum in
a = aopt ￿
1
2t
[2v ￿ ￿c ￿ 2cI]
It is easy to see that aopt > aCS (as v ￿ cI +
￿(3￿2￿)
4￿3￿ c). Since aCS > aLI, we
can conclude that W(aCS;c) > W(aLI;c).































2t(v ￿ cI ￿ 1￿￿
4￿3￿￿c) = aCS ￿ 0 and 1 ￿ 1
2
1￿￿
4￿3￿ > 0, it is apparent that
W(aTI;0) > W(aCS;c).
￿
Extension of the model: necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium:
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(2qA + qB ￿ 2pA ￿ pB ￿ c) (16)











+[pA ￿ cI ￿
￿
2d











(2qA + qB ￿ 2pA ￿ pB ￿ c) (17)











+[pA ￿ cI ￿
￿
2d
(qA + qB ￿ pA ￿ pB)(qA ￿ pA ￿ c)]
da
dpA
The market shares a and b are given by










(2 ￿ ￿)qA ￿
1
2
￿qB] ￿ d ￿ (eA)2










(2 ￿ ￿)qB ￿
1
2








(2 ￿ ￿)qA +
1
2







(2 ￿ ￿)qB +
1
2
￿qA ￿ pB) (21)
Total di⁄erentiation gives
t ￿ da = ￿dpA ￿ ￿
b
(a + b)2[pA ￿
1
2






(a + b)2[pA ￿
1
2



















(2 ￿ ￿)qA ￿
1
2




[pA ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qA ￿ qB +
1
2
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t ￿ db = ￿￿
a
(a + b)2[pB ￿
1
2






(a + b)2[pB ￿
1
2




























































Xa = t + ￿
b
(a + b)2[pA ￿
1
2






(a + b)2[pA ￿
1
2























(2 ￿ ￿) +
￿
2d
[pA ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qA ￿ qB +
1
2










(a + b)2[pB ￿
1
2




Yb = t + ￿
a
(a + b)2[pB ￿
1
2
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2v ￿ (2 ￿ ￿)qB
￿
g
De￿ne the Lagrange function
LA = ￿A + ￿ppA + ￿qqA + ￿p[v ￿ pA] + ￿q[g(qB) ￿ qA]
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for LA are then necessary conditions for (pA;qA)
being a best response of CSD A on (pB;qB). Finally, the Kuhn-Tucker condi-
tions for LA together with
pB = pA (34)
qB = qA (35)
form necessary conditions for a symmetric equilibrium. As before, we ￿nd that













+ ￿p ￿ ￿p = 0
0 ￿ pA ￿ v;0 ￿ qA ￿ v, ￿p;￿q;￿p;￿q ￿ 0
￿p ￿ pA = ￿q ￿ qA = ￿p[v ￿ pA] = ￿q[v ￿ qA] = 0
where the equations 16 to 35 for the variables d￿A
dqA , d￿A





dpA, Xa, Xb, Xp, Xq, Ya, Yb, Yp, Yq, pB and qB have to hold. We
solve these conditions for pA, qA, a for a number of parameter constellations
￿;￿;v;t;c;cI;￿;d that ful￿l our assumptions ￿;t;v > 0, ￿ < 1, v ￿ cI, c ￿ 0,
t ￿ 2v and v ￿ cI ￿
￿(3￿2￿)
4￿3￿ c from the basic model. We also calculate for
all these cases the respective equilibrium welfare W = 2￿A + ta2 as de￿ned in
Section 5.
We use a heuristic approach to verify that for the respective parameter
constellations, the prices that ful￿l our necessary conditions indeed constitute
an equilibrium. We simply test if CSD A could get better o⁄ with any prices
pA and qA such that pA;qA 2 f0; 1
10, ..., vg. We ￿nd that this is not the case,
indicating that our necessary conditions constitute an equilibrium.
￿
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